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GENDER AND JUSTICE IN FAMILY LAW DISPUTES: WOMEN, MEDIATION, AND RELIGIOUS
ARBITRATION
by
Amelia K. Philips*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Gender and Justice in Family Law Disputes: Women, Mediation, and Religious
Arbitration,1 edited by Samia Bano,2 features diverse contributions to the discussion of
dispute resolution in terms of the family, religion, gender, sexuality, and beyond. The
authors take a variety of approaches, whether using feminist theory,3 philosophy,4 direct
research and study,5 or first-hand experience with clients6 to make their contributions to
the broader discussion. These approaches often overlap, as authors frequently blend two
or more of these methodologies to construct a compelling view of the aforementioned
issues.7 Additionally, while the book generally focuses on practices surrounding dispute
resolution in family settings in the context of Islam, the authors frequently pivot to
important, broader discussions, whether in discussing dispute resolution or gender more
generally,8 or in discussing other religions.9
The book does run into some small problems with balance. Specifically, the
accessibility of the book for readers may differ between chapters, as some chapters
remain fairly simple to digest10 while others introduce more complex literature that may
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not be as accessible to those without a background in the subject matter;11 readers may
overlook the simpler or more complex chapters depending on their background and
approach. Thus, readers may find an imbalance in the work, not necessarily because of an
imbalance in the content, but because of an imbalance in the levels of analysis and
abstraction of the subject matter that occur over the course of the book. However, the
imbalance is ultimately a minor complaint with what is otherwise an expertly assembled
collection of essays that speak eloquently to complex issues.
II.

OVERVIEW

Gender and Justice12 features contributions from sixteen authors with a variety of
perspectives explored in each essay and make each chapter feel complete. Moreover,
there are a number of themes that emerge that make the book as a whole feel cohesive, as
chapters frequently return to these themes from different angles. While a work brought
together from the works of a variety of contributors can feel disjointed, Bano has
arranged the articles with a logical flow, and there are a number of common themes that
help to tie the chapters closely together.
The book is organized into two parts, with the book’s first half beginning with
perspectives on the titular concepts as they exist in the United Kingdom, particularly
Great Britain. The second half of the book features perspectives on these same subjects
from around the world, with chapters on the United States, Canada, India, Australia,
Finland, and Italy. With few deviations, the primary focus is on Islam and on Muslim
women in the context of mediation, religious arbitration, and family disputes generally.
Where the book does deviate, it does so in the interests of discussing family law
generally,13or in discussing other religions such as Judaism14 and Roman Catholicism.15
Outside the book’s prescribed order, there are five conversations that emerge
throughout the book. First is a broad discussion of mediation, religious arbitration, and
family law in conceptual and practical terms.16 Second, multiple authors discuss religious
arbitration from a perspective strongly rooted in critical theory and feminist literature.17
Third, the book’s largest discussion centers on Muslim family dispute resolution methods
11
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as applied in different countries and in relation to state law.18 Fourth, there are detailed
inquiries into Judaism and Roman Catholicism, providing insight into religious dispute
resolution within these belief systems themselves, but also in comparison to Islam.19 Fifth,
there is a discussion of LGBTQ+/queer people of faith. The final topic is less prominent
in comparison to others, but perhaps the dearth here will encourage further research by
others into the needs of sexual and gender minorities in communities of faith.20 This book
review seeks to provide overviews of how the book handles these themes rather than an
exhaustive account of the research, analysis, and theory involved, as the authors cover
significant ground in great detail.
III.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

While many of the articles in the book are specific applications of research,
experience, and theory in particular contexts, two articles also perform a foundational
role for the discussion of dispute resolution. Lisa Webley explores the general dynamics
of dispute resolution, namely the complex roles and functions that mediation can serve in
family contexts. 21 Sarah Beskine, though, discusses family law and dispute resolution
from a practitioner’s perspective, with some discussion of religion as well. 22 These
chapters are not exclusively foundational; for instance, Webley touches on feminist
theory,23 and Beskine touches on some concepts within Jewish marriages.24 Nonetheless,
these two chapters also help to lay some of the groundwork for dispute resolution for
readers that may lack familiarity with it.
Webley makes three main observations: 1) a delineation between the perceived
individualism of legal approaches and mutualism of mediation-based approaches to
family law, 25 2) a shift in family justice from approaches in governmental or legal
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frameworks to non-state family dispute frameworks,26 and 3) the fact that inequities in
power can emerge and are often part and parcel of family law and family dispute
resolution.27 Webley argues that women may potentially benefit from moving away from
dispute resolution methods that have historically harmed them.28 But if gender inequality
is societally reinforced, Webley states, “private ordering may be yet another arena in
which male dominance can be reasserted, and this time away from the glare of public
scrutiny or challenge.”29 This sentiment has particular force when viewed alongside some
of the later chapters of the book, as they address situations where these diverging
conclusions arise.30
In contrast with Webley’s chapter, Sarah Beskine’s chapter is written less like a
critical analysis of alternative dispute resolution and more like a manual for practitioners.
The first topic Beskine covers, determining whether mediation is the appropriate avenue
for a dispute, leads with questions about the power dynamics and relations that can be a
product of family disputes generally. 31 She subsequently discusses the importance of
legal advice as important even for those considering mediation, as well as misconceptions
about what the law actually says about various family-related issues.32 She also briefly
outlines the roles of mediation in family disputes, and does so in rather broad terms while
distinguishing between the positions and dispositions of mediator and lawyer.33
Beskine does engage with religion, albeit rather scarcely, through references to
Abrahamic religions via some specific aspects of Jewish marriages.34 But mentions of
religion in Beskine’s chapter remain scant. Beskine’s vague handling of religious issues
would seem to undermine the cohesion of this chapter with the rest of the book. However,
it is arguably not these smaller discussions of religion that are important in this chapter,
but the chapter’s presentment of secular issues that religion may in fact shape. Given
Beskine’s breadth of approach and placed alongside theory-heavy and research-heavy
articles, her article may be easy to dismiss as out of place. Yet, even without delving into
26
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religion, Beskine’s chapter provides a foundation for the reader for the rest of the book,
just as Webley’s provides a good introduction to much of the theoretical discussion had
later in the book.
Perhaps the biggest criticism is that the varying levels of analysis between
Beskine’s chapter and other chapters contribute to the book feeling slightly unbalanced,
not in terms of its content but merely in terms of complexity. Ultimately this imbalance is
a minor concern and may, in fact, be a net positive as it prevents the book from becoming
too solely focused on academic endeavors. Overall, these two chapters help strengthen
the framework for the reader’s understanding of the specific research and analysis done
by the other authors of the book – though this is not to say that these chapters are
subservient to the purposes of all of the other chapters. Rather, these chapters perform
double duty: as self-contained works and as works supporting much of the rest of the
book in kind.
IV.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND FEMINIST ANALYSIS

The book’s introduction makes clear that readers can expect engagement with
critical feminist theory on the topics the book presents, 35 and nowhere is that more
apparent than in chapters two, three, and nine of the book. Chapter two, written by Bano,
explores feminist perspectives on mediation in conjunction with mediation as affecting
Muslim women in Britain. 36 Chapter three, written by Pragna Patel, engages with the
“privatization of justice” in terms of Muslim mediation in Britain.37 Chapter nine, written
by Gopika Solanki, addresses the role of feminism in action in India in terms of religious
family dispute resolution.38 Each of these chapters contributes to a broader conversation
about feminist perspectives on mediation and alternative dispute resolution, in addition to
the application of those perspectives in practice, from different corners of the globe.
From the outset, Bano identifies that her analysis is firmly rooted in feminist
theory as applied to dispute resolution.39 Specifically, the first topic Bano discusses is the
interaction between feminism and religion, including how feminist assessments of
religion have been constructed over time and how feminist views of religion must
recognize the multiple dimensions in the lives of religious women.40 She then segues into
a discussion of women’s “personal autonomy” as well as “group autonomy” in Muslim
communities, and how private dispute resolution in a religious context affects
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autonomy. 41 Bano is particularly successful here, as she approaches these topics in
feminist theory with rigor, but also makes them relatively digestible for those without
backgrounds in either feminist theory or alternative dispute resolution. She explains a
concept like intersectionality and then links that concept to how feminist approaches to
dispute resolution can reflect the underpinnings of the concept of intersectionality.42
For the rest of the chapter, Bano focuses on Muslim mediation within Britain,
while weaving feminist perspectives on mediation and religion with Muslim mediation
specifically. She raises the possibility of “patriarchal relations of power” in Muslim
mediation, 43 but argues for a non-essentializing perspective of Muslim women in
mediation settings; she argues the very act of painting women as fully denied
independence by cultural and religious aspects of Islam itself impugns the independence
women may actually have in these settings. 44 The measured approach taken here is
extremely welcome for a reader unfamiliar with the subjects of feminism, Islam, or
dispute resolution. Such approachable analyses are vital to improving the discussion
about Islam in general, which the introduction of the book notes to be fraught with
problematic tendencies.45
Bano mentions, among other feminist organizations, the Southall Black Sisters,46
and its director, Pragna Patel, contributes an article to this book as well. 47 Patel is
concerned with the rise of conservative, fundamentalist religiosity, and “non-state legal
orders” having a negative effect on women, as compared to the efforts of groups like the
Southall Black Sisters that “[use] the law to eradicate the silences in the law in respect of
gender bias and other forms of inequality.”48 In particular, Patel worries that discussions
on the interaction between Muslim dispute resolution and its recognition by the state may
“[gloss] over any analysis of patriarchal power and other social dynamics within minority
communities.”49 Patel also argues that the language of “agency” might be assimilated by
those who actually lessen women’s agency under the guise of improving the agency of
41
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Muslim women.50
Patel’s outlook for women in Muslim dispute resolution is more pessimistic than
Bano’s. 51 She notes that Sharia councils, as well as institutions like the Muslim
Arbitration Tribunal,52 operate in manners that tend to exert power over women, rather
than offer them independence.53 She emphasizes that institutional subjugation of women
hurts feminist efforts to provide more state-based protections for women.54 Additionally,
Patel looks to her organization’s studies wherein minority women of many religions
reported their experiences with religious arbitration, particularly its restrictions, and
women’s reluctance to engage with religious arbitration in the first place. 55 The
overriding concern, then, is that the more that the state recognizes status quo religious
arbitration structures and outcomes, the more the scales tip away from independence for
women.56 In the context of the book’s discussion on feminism, Patel’s chapter is not as
theory-heavy, but represents some of the concrete application of the arguments therein.
Her concerns echo and reinforce some of the issues raised by Lisa Webley, as well, 57 and
contribute another important perspective to the complex discussion of how to best
address the issues of Muslim women in family dispute settings.
Gopika Solanki engages in a similar discussion as Bano and Patel, but from a
different area of the world: India. Solanki frames the chapter respective to critical
feminist studies surrounding autonomy. 58 The primary focus on the chapter is on the
Awaaz-e-Niswaan (“AEN”), a “Mumbai-based secular Muslim women’s feminist
collective,” and its efforts at dispute resolution through women’s courts. 59 Whereas
Patel’s chapter illuminated a less positive outlook on alternative dispute resolution for
minority religious women,60 Solanki’s conclusions present a more positive picture of an
50

Patel, supra note 17, at 85-86 (citing R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School
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organization engaging in family issues and dispute resolution from a position of feminism,
focusing on the needs of women specifically. 61 The AEN was founded by a Muslim
feminist in 1985 and “offers its services to women across religious boundaries and
focuses on Muslim women’s rights within the framework of feminist solidarity.” 62
Solanki’s chapter thus contributes to a more robust understanding of how feminist family
dispute resolution projects can assist women’s needs.
One particularly interesting point is the approach that the AEN takes toward
dispute resolution. Specifically, Solanki describes the AEN as “explicitly pro-women”
and “privileges women’s voices,” which stands in stark opposition to conventional
wisdom that reifies neutrality as the ideal standard in assessing dispute resolution
processes.63 In terms of family arbitration in particular, the AEN “begins the arbitration
process with the feminist presupposition that women are oppressed in societal institutions
of marriage and family and that the subordination of women is unjust.”64 Solanki explains
that neutrality preserves the dominance of patriarchal constructions of family and gender,
and that the proper response is to explicitly prefer women’s perspectives rather than
negotiate from the center.65 AEN team members have stated that the approach has been
met with accusations of bias from men, 66 which is itself an interesting claim; as one
interviewee notes, men have “the whole society to turn to.”67 This perspective on dispute
resolution in general is a refreshing one. It is perhaps jarring to speak of neutrality or
impartiality as a negative in alternative dispute resolution, but Solanki illustrates the
importance of this perspective well through illustrating the possible pitfalls of an
obsession with neutrality.
Taken together, these three chapters effectively represent different aspects of the
feminist project as applied to family dispute resolution and dispute resolution writ large.
There is a detailed conversation about the role of dispute resolution structures in the lives
of women, rooted in critical feminist literature. The downside to the detailed discussion is
that the amount of feminist theory, despite efforts to present it with clarity, may still be
less accessible to readers than other sections of the book because of the perceived or
actual complexities of theory. Nevertheless, the thoughtful analyses by these authors are
important; with family disputes being a unique space for gendered concerns, feminist
theory is particularly salient.
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V.

ISLAM AND DIFFERING APPROACHES TO FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Many of the authors in the book take a more research-based than theoretical
approach, discussing Muslim family dispute resolution in various countries, and women’s
issues within that context. The first part of the book focuses on perspectives from
different authors on the United Kingdom, while the second focuses on perspectives in
other countries. Where the research-based chapters are concerned, this split between the
United Kingdom and other parts of the world creates space for multiple types of concrete
comparisons. Approaches and perspectives may be compared within the United Kingdom
itself, or between the United Kingdom and countries elsewhere, or between countries in
that latter category.
A.

The United Kingdom

Three chapters focus on the United Kingdom. The first of these, chapter five, is
written by Saher Tariq. It is similar to Sarah Beskine’s in some respects as Tariq writes
from the perspective of a practitioner, and draws from first-hand experience in detailing
the complexities of Islamic divorce.68 Tariq combines this experience, as well, with her
analysis of the Holy Quran and principles of Islam in her approach to discussing divorce
resolution in the context of Islam. 69 In particular, she begins with Islam’s principles
favoring peaceful resolutions of disagreements between individuals as a basis for
understanding the role of dispute resolution processes in Muslim communities. 70
Concerning divorce, Tariq explains the nature of religious divorces in Islam: a husband
may terminate a marriage at will via a talaq, but a wife must be granted a khula, an
indication of divorce, by a Sharia council or similar process.71
Tariq then turns to the obstacles and possible solutions for women who desire a
religious divorce.72 She considers both a number of broad factors, like the need to go to a
council at all,73 the lack of oversight in the United Kingdom over panels themselves, and
very granular issues such as the ethnic background of a panel or the actual procedures
used that may affect where a woman seeks help.74 Additionally, Tariq illustrates how
Muslim women seeking divorces may have community or family concerns regarding
financial and immigration issues weighing against their decision to seek a divorce.75 She
68

Tariq, supra note 6, at 126, 132-136.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 127 (citing Quran 4:35, 49:10; 3 Sahih Al-Bukhari 49:870).
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then turns to solutions for these and other issues,76specifically a service she developed
called Islamic Divorce & Khula.77 By removing or reducing certain procedural barriers,
and presuming in favor of divorces, “the service works on the underlying principle that if
a woman wants a khula she is entitled to get a khula.”78 Tariq frames the service as a
plausible solution for women seeking religious dispute resolution where many of the
options in society are inadequate, and at the very least, it may be helpful even as a model
simply by reframing or resisting some of the presumptions of Islamic divorce.
The subject of the inadequacy of dispute resolution options for women, and
possible solutions for that inadequacy, transitions neatly into the next chapter. Rehana
Parveen presents research on the experiences of women interacting with Sharia councils,
conducted through interviews, reviews of cases, and observations of council proceedings
of the Islamic Judiciary Board (“IJB”), along with criticisms. 79 For instance, Parveen
notes that “[n]o women are employed at the IJB in any capacity,” and sees this as a
deficiency of the IJB for women. 80 She notes that women tended to prefer the legal
system because of the ease of access to information and assistance, and that the IJB could
employ women to help provide that to its women clients more effectively. 81 In fact,
Parveen noted that her presence, even simply as a bystander doing research, assuaged the
anxieties of women at the IJB.82 From a woman’s perspective, this concern is intuitive
even outside of this context. A system or group run exclusively by men is likely to lack
the understanding of women’s issues that a woman would be able to provide from her
perspective.83
Parveen also discusses the relationship between Sharia councils and English law.
Concerning the IJB, the board meeting involved a question of English law, but the board
members lacked the expertise to resolve that question optimally.84 She also notes that
Islam can actually be more flexible than English law in some cases of divorce, perhaps
dispelling some myths regarding differences between religious and secular law. 85 Her
observations help to contextualize the options women have under English law, and how
76

See, e.g., Tariq, supra note 6, at 134 (discussing Muslim women potentially not fully knowing about their
rights to a divorce).
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Tariq, supra note 6, at 136.
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these options might align or differ with processes elsewhere.
Next, Shaista Gohir and Nazmin Akthar-Sheikh’s article provides more insight
into the dimensions of obtaining a religious divorce in Britain. Their observations operate
from the perspective of the charity Muslim Women’s Network UK (“MWNUK”), and the
obstacles women face in divorce settings.86 They first discuss non-religious alternative
dispute resolution, where Gohir and Akthar-Sheikh note that such processes will, even in
the presence of qualified third parties, overlook issues of faith that may be key to
resolving disputes.87 However, simply introducing more Muslims into dispute resolution
processes is not sufficient, because parties often want someone of another religion to
oversee the procedure on impartial grounds.88 The introduction of non-religious dispute
resolution is interesting and unique, as most of the book focuses on religion-first
processes. Discussing dispute resolution outside of these processes can provide an
additional dimension in examining family issues by elucidating the layers of complexity
that can accompany disputes at the intersection of family and religion.
Gohir and Akthar-Sheikh discuss religious avenues as well. First, they discuss the
bisar, a process involving the consultation of elders, practiced primarily but not
exclusively among Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain. 89 However, concerns about the
“patriarchal beliefs and cultural bias” of the elders, along with the inequity and
unenforceability of some decisions, make the pitfalls with this approach clear.90 Gohir
and Akthar-Sheikh also discuss Sharia councils, bringing back to the surface concerns
with these organizations, including poor treatment of women, but they go a step further
by discussing the legal ramifications of what they perceive as Sharia councils performing
arbitration that should be subject to English arbitration law, but are not.91 Moreover, they
discuss that even in the case of a body that operates under the law like the Muslim
Arbitration Tribunal, “questions of transparency and fairness remain of concern.”92 The
authors briefly discuss “benchmarking” Sharia councils to monitor their behavior,
however, it likely would not suffice because there is no exhaustive list of Sharia councils,
and because the process would have to be opt-in.93
Instead, Gohir and Akthar-Sheikh consider other solutions that might help to
provide recourse under the law for British Muslim women. The authors describe the
interaction between civil and religious marriages – where a civil divorce may not be
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granted until a husband grants a religious divorce, or, alternatively (and more accessible
to women), a civil divorce may serve as grounds for a religious divorce before a
council.94 They also consider the possibility of using the Equality Act 2010 to address
practices by Sharia councils that treat women unfavorably, such as charging women more
to access services.95 Though these solutions may be imperfect, they illustrate the range of
possibilities under English law that may be utilized to benefit Muslim women, and in
doing so also reinforce the book’s robust analysis of the United Kingdom.
B.

Countries Outside the United Kingdom

Multiple authors address issues outside the United Kingdom, and two articles in
particular stand out as the most apt for comparative analysis of dispute resolution
processes. The first is Ghena Krayem and Farrah Ahmed’s research detailing dispute
resolution methods among Muslims in Australia.96 Discussing Australian approaches to
Muslim dispute resolution, Krayem and Ahmed use the broad term “Islamic community
processes,”97 of which this research represents some of the first of its kind.98 They note
that these processes are not established or incorporated in the same way as the processes
in the United Kingdom.99 The propriety of the term becomes clear over the course of the
chapter, as the first process discussed is perhaps the most communitarian and least
official: family dispute resolution within the family.100 And where family may fail, the
next step is not to turn to an established body, but to community leaders in a seemingly
ad hoc role.101
Australian processes are not completely decentralized, as Krayem and Ahmed
note the role of community organizations and Muslim women’s organizations.102 Notably,
however, the authors indicate that an indispensable function of both types of
organizations is their “referral role,” wherein individuals are directed to services that
might be useful to them; 103 women’s organizations play a pivotal role here. 104 These
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references lead to what might be considered the highest level of the loose hierarchy
described here – imams. 105 In contrast to the United Kingdom where much of the
discussion focused on established bodies like Sharia councils,106 in Australia, individual
imams seem to take on the role of mediator or arbitrator alone, dealing with divorces and
the surrounding financial and custody matters.107 With these processes in mind, Krayem
and Ahmed turn to the lack of structure, including the potential for a lack of expertise and
lack of unity among imams on certain issues.108 The authors also discuss the possibility
of patriarchy and male control over dispute resolution, both generally and in specific
circumstances like inequality in the division of assets between divorcees in favor of
husbands.109 In this sense, similar questions of gender inequality that arose in chapters
focused on feminism also arise in these studies as well. Even without this specific context,
in general, who has tried to (formally or informally) resolve disputes of any kind within
one’s own family, or has heard of other families having to resolve their own disputes,
could understand that such disputes can be fraught with inconsistency and potential
inequity – highlighting some of the potential issues with these decentralized processes.
The last section of the chapter concludes with an analysis of how Islamic
community processes interact with Australian law.110 Krayem and Ahmed note that the
dispute resolution processes performed in Muslim communities in Australia are
potentially subject to Australian law under the Family Law Act. 111 Moreover, agreements
made between couples may be submitted to Australian courts for review, to ensure they
are acceptable under the provisions of the Family Law Act.112 This process is just one
example of where religious couples may turn to the state, as the authors also discuss that
where religious avenues are inadequate for their needs, couples may turn to Australian
family courts.113 Whether these aspects of the law change how dispute resolution is done
in Muslim communities in Australia may be an open question, but it does illustrate some
similarities in how religious dispute resolution may be positioned in relation to the law
with places such as the United Kingdom.
Al-Sharmani, Mustasaari, and Ismail address some of the same overarching
questions of religious dispute resolution, gender, and national law through their research
in Finland, wherein they studied the dispute resolution processes of five mosques in
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Helsinki. 114 They observed for instance, that as the mosques served different ethnic
populations,115 different disputes surfaced: “For example, polygamy disputes were more
common among Somali disputants, whereas disputes about gender norms were more
common in ethnically mixed marriages.” 116 There were also structural differences, as
some mosques handled disputes through a single imam, a group of individuals, or some
other structure. 117 Despite these differences, the authors explain that the mosques had
relatively similar aims of supporting Islamic principles of “harmonious family relations”
by promoting mutually acceptable solutions to disputes, as well as preserving stability for
Muslims in Finland generally. 118 The authors also note that mosques would routinely
consult other mosques or religious authorities to ensure that their decisions would be
acceptable in the community.119 This interconnectivity between Finnish mosques might
be likened to a larger-scale and more unified approach to dispute resolution.
Towards the end of the chapter, Al-Sharmani, Mustasaari, and Ismail discuss
interactions between the mosques’ dispute resolution efforts and Finnish law. 120 For
example, it was not apparent to the mosques to what degree legal divorces and religious
divorces may coincide or work in tandem; in Finnish law, divorce is exclusively the
domain of the state, and it is not certain whether mosques would accept legal divorces for
religious divorces when Finnish law and Islam conflict.121 These and other issues raised
by the authors provide another site for comparison and help to solidify the book in
general as a valuable resource for comparative family law. In general, both this article on
Finland and the article discussed previously on Australia help bring together three
different perspectives on dispute resolution as combined with the book’s analysis of the
United Kingdom and can contribute to a healthy debate on the best methods for helping
women in communities of faith.
VI.

JUDEO-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

While the vast majority of the book focuses on Islam, Judaism and Roman
Catholicism are also explored briefly. Two chapters spend more time than other chapters
on these Abrahamic religions. First, Wendy Kennett’s chapter on North America explores
Judaism and Jewish family dispute resolution methods, in comparing and contrasting
them with Islam and Muslim processes. 122 Second, Maria Federica Moscati, in the
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closing chapter of the book, explores the relationship between Catholicism and dispute
resolution in Italy among same-sex couples. 123 These two perspectives diversify the
conversation of religious dispute resolution throughout the book, both in comparison to
Muslim practice and as a separate topic entirely.
Wendy Kennett’s article compares Judaism and Islam in a number of social and
religious respects, and what those comparisons ultimately mean for family-based dispute
resolution in North America. She responds to argument that Muslim arbitration could
benefit from taking inspiration from the Beth Din of America by identifying two issues:
how each religion applies their respective religious laws, and whether individuals of faith
want such applications.124 She discusses the immigration history and demographics of
Jews and Muslims in North America,125 the establishment of community batei din and
more established bodies like the Beth Din of America by Jews, 126 and some of the
differences in the development of religious law between Judaism and Islam.127 Kennett
notes a “unity in the development of Jewish law” that is not as present in Islam,
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particularly among Western Muslims.128 Turning from the issue of differences of religion
to differences in demand for dispute resolution, Kennett looks to research that, contrary
to countervailing suppositions, there was not much desire for Muslim arbitration for
family issues in Canada.129 Kennett distinguishes this from beth din arbitration methods
with a longer history in the United States and Canada.130 But in divorce, Muslim women
demanded religious dispute resolution more than in other sources of dispute.131 Thereafter,
Kennett engages in a comparison of Islam and Judaism in terms of religious approaches
to divorce, and notes that in North America, obtaining a religious divorce in Islam is in
some ways easier than in Judaism. 132 Kennett references Julie Macfarlane’s research,
wherein many Muslim women were able to obtain a divorce, and generally left other
family matters to the legal mechanisms of the state.133 By contrast, in Orthodox Judaism,
when the husband—the only party with the power to divorce—refuses to accept his
wife’s request for divorce the options to resolve the divorce are extremely limited.134
Even where Judaism is perhaps more readily understood in North American countries
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like the United States and Canada, presenting these kinds of comparisons is important to
demonstrate that even Judeo-Christian religions are not devoid of their own problems and
problematic structures. Examining the problems in both Islam and Judaism also
demonstrates that while it might be easy to unilaterally dismiss religions as oppressive,
for historical or dogmatic reasons, the reality is more complex.
Outside of North America, Moscati also explores the dimensions of religiosity
and dispute resolution in Italy, as concerns Roman Catholicism and same-sex couples.
Even in a vacuum,135 the discussion of Roman Catholicism’s effects on the Italian legal
landscape is itself illuminating. To be sure, Moscati notes that the Roman Catholic
Church has had effects on Italian law that resulted in homophobic legal and social
structures.136 In terms of the book’s discussion of women, as well, Moscati notes that the
Catholic Church’s influence in Italian law has resulted in Italian legal and social
structures tending to reflect “the patriarchal and hierarchical Catholic conception of
family relationships.”137 Even in a chapter that seems rather separate from the book, the
discussion of religion’s effect on the perception of the family in society is given greater
depth by this analysis of Catholicism in Italy that frames the rest of the chapter, and
contributes to the conversation about Judeo-Christian religions alongside the more
prominent conversation about Islam. In a book that may seem imbalanced in terms of the
level of analysis, the focus on Islam may seem like another layer of imbalance given the
book’s reference to “religious arbitration” in general in the title. However, these chapters
help to keep the conversation well-rounded.

VII.

LGBTQ+/QUEER ISSUES138

Much of the book is spent talking about heterosexual relationships. However, the
book engages with gender and sexual minorities in multiple places, concerning both the
role that queerness or LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, etc.) issues
play in larger questions of feminism, and how religion and religious dispute resolution
affect queer people and queer relationships. Moscati’s chapter serves as the largest focal
point in the book on the topic of queerness, discussing same-sex couples in relation to
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Catholicism.139 Gopika Solanki’s chapter also discusses the open support of the AEN for
LGBT causes in India as part of its feminist approach to the larger project of helping
women.140 Bringing these issues even briefly to the forefront of the book ensures that the
book does not focus exclusively on heteronormative conceptions of the family.
Acknowledging relationships from outside the lens of heteronormativity may also open
space for more robust and in-depth conversations and work in the future on religion,
sexuality, and family issues.
Moscati discusses how Catholicism is a source of disputes and a factor in
resolving disputes. 141 The latter point is the most illuminating, as she discusses
Catholicism’s influence in Italy as constraining the amount of alternatives available to
same-sex couples seeking to resolve a dispute, as well as the reticence of individuals to
be specific in some cases about sexuality when looking for advice from, say, a priest.142
These two discussions are buttressed by interviews conducted as part of a larger research
project spanning multiple European countries, and thus allow for the presentation of
unique personal experiences. 143 The experiences are at once familiar and new, in the
context of the book. They illustrate a running theme of conflict between personal life and
faith but are told from completely different perspectives of both religion and sexuality.
Moscati’s chapter combines three important areas of discussion: religion, sexuality, and
the family – and considering these three topics in tandem can be important to
understanding, interrogating, and challenging presumptions about religion, about families,
and about family disputes. An understanding of family dispute resolution cannot be
complete with only an understanding of a heteronormative conception of the family, and
religious family dispute resolution should similarly also be understood as concerning
queer people of faith.
The only other place in the book which specifically addresses LGBTQ+/queer
issues is in Gopika Solanki’s chapter on India, in discussing the AEN. Solanki explains
that the group “is one of the few Muslim women’s groups working on religious family
laws that has openly supported. . . (LGBT) movements in India.” 144 Moreover, she
indicates that part of the aim of the AEN’s project, in terms of feminism, is to increase
the ability for women’s “political engagement with broader social movements,” including
those for LGBT issues.145 One anecdote near the end of the chapter actually discusses a
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woman’s experience with coming to the AEN for meetings at a library after coming
across some literature on sexuality, which in turn resulted in that woman having more
robust discussions with the AEN and engaging in more LGBT activism.146 While not as
tailored to the issue of dispute resolution, integrating these kinds of discussions can also
contribute to larger discussions surrounding religion, gender, and sexuality generally.
The relative lack of discussion of LGBTQ+/queer issues in this book may initially
seem disappointing, presence of any discussion at all is actually refreshing because
literature on queerness in alternative dispute resolution settings is not always easy to find.
While family dispute resolution is just one setting where these issues are important (labor
arbitration and negotiations over certain benefits in the workplace come to mind as
another setting), the presence of these two articles by Moscati and Solanki expands the
literature base in the realm of dispute resolution for vulnerable and marginalized groups.
They provide positive contributions to the discussion of how to provide for the wellbeing of queer individuals, particularly those of faith, around the world.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most impressive thing about Gender and Justice in Family Law
Disputes: Women, Mediation, and Religious Arbitration is the sheer amount of ground it
covers. In discussions about family dispute resolution in general, feminism, Muslim
dispute resolution methods, Judeo-Christian family dispute resolution, and queerness,
each chapter contributes something new to one of these important broader conversations.
The book’s sixteen different authors and their independent works add different
dimensions to these different conversations, whether engaging in a comparison of state
dispositions toward religious law, a comparison of religious perspectives themselves, or
investigations into the dynamics of gender and sexuality alongside religion. While the
chapters do occasionally vary in terms of complexity, which may give the impression of a
stylistic or methodological imbalance, at the same time that variety of approach may also
prevent the book from feeling confined purely to academic or practitioner’s perspectives.
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